Information Management to Mitigate Loss of Control Airline Accidents by Daniels, Taumi S. et al.
1 
 
Information Management to Mitigate Loss of 
Control Airline Accidents 
Timothy J. Etherington1, Lynda J. Kramer2, Steven D. Young3, Emory 
T. Evans4, Taumi S. Daniels5, James R. Barnes6, and Yamira Santiago-
Espada7 
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, 23681, USA 
Loss of control inflight continues to be the leading contributor to airline accidents 
worldwide and unreliable airspeed has been a contributing factor in many of these accidents. 
Airlines and the FAA developed training programs for pilot recognition of these airspeed 
events and many checklists have been designed to help pilots troubleshoot. In addition, new 
aircraft designs incorporate features to detect and respond in such situations. NASA has been 
using unreliable airspeed events while conducting research recommended by the Commercial 
Aviation Safety Team. Even after significant industry focus on unreliable airspeed, research 
and other evidence shows that highly skilled and trained pilots can still be confused by the 
condition and there is a lack of understanding of what the associated checklist(s) attempts to 
uncover. Common mode failures of analog sensors designed for measuring airspeed continue 
to confound both humans and automation when determining which indicators are correct. 
This paper describes failures that have occurred in the past and where/how pilots may still 
struggle in determining reliable airspeed when confronted with conflicting information. Two 
latest generation aircraft architectures will be discussed and contrasted. This information will 
be used to describe why more sensors used in classic control theory will not solve the problem. 
Technology concepts are suggested for utilizing existing synoptic pages and a new synoptic 
page called System Interactive Synoptic (SIS). SIS details the flow of flight critical data 
through the avionics system and how it is used by the automation. This new synoptic page as 
well as existing synoptics can be designed to be used in concert with a simplified electronic 
checklist (sECL) to significantly reduce the time to configure the flight deck avionics in the 
event of a system or sensor failure.  
I. Introduction 
In the period 2010 to 2014, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) sponsored a study of 18 commercial 
aviation events that occurred within ~10 years prior to the study kickoff. The results identified 12 recurring problem 
themes involving loss of airplane state awareness (ASA) by the flight crew and suggested a number of intervention 
strategies [1]. CAST assessed these strategies for effectiveness and feasibility, and recommended Safety 
Enhancements (SEs) for the industry to implement [2]. Of these, six were deemed to require research to enable the 
enhancement. As part of its role in CAST, NASA initiated subprojects within the Airspace Operations and Safety 
Program to collaborate with the industry and the FAA to produce many of these outputs.  
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The Automation and Information Management Experiments (AIME) were a series of NASA experiments 
conducted to address or achieve outputs defined within SE-207 [3] and SE-208 [4]. Together, the technologies under 
development and evaluation as part of the AIME series were intended to enable improved energy, automation, and/or 
system state awareness, as well as to provide new predictive capabilities with respect to these aspects of ASA.  
As specified by CAST, the success criteria for all technology development research under SE-207 and SE-208 
were to advance the technology readiness level (TRL) to five or greater. For the AIME experiments, this criteria was 
interpreted to be met by: 
(1) demonstration of the technology in a relevant environment and across a span of conditions such as those 
encountered in the events studied by CAST; and,  
(2) assessment that the technology with a pilot interface was judged usable and acceptable.  
Demonstrations were supported by data to show that the technology performed its intended function with no 
unexplainable behavior or unintended consequences. These goals were accomplished for the research reported here 
using high-fidelity full-mission flight simulations. In these environments, not only can typical crew procedures and 
workload be replicated, but complex off-nominal situations such as those encountered during accidents could also be 
simulated. The simulations afforded the opportunity to test across a number of crews with disparate experience levels, 
expertise, and behavior tendencies.  
The first AIME study (AIME 1) was completed in 2016, advancing and evaluating four technology concepts: a 
new flight-critical data synoptic page (referred to as the System Interaction Synoptic, or SIS) with simplified electronic 
checklists (sECL), predictive alerting of energy-related (PAE) events and display, automation mode change prediction 
and display (referred to as the Trajectory Prediction System, or TPS), and dynamic maneuver envelope (ME) 
estimation and display [5-11].  
Completed in May 2018, the second AIME study (AIME 2) investigated three ASA concepts: enhanced synoptic 
(eSyn) pages, including SIS, used in conjunction with sECL, an enhanced airspeed control indicator, and stall recovery 
guidance [12-16].  
The third AIME study (AIME 2.5), completed in February 2019, evaluated enhancements to three previously 
tested ASA concepts: SIS with sECL, PAE, and TPS [17]. Two indicators aimed at supporting the flight crew’s 
awareness of energy state during loss of airspeed events were also evaluated: a synthetic vision primary flight display 
augmented with a flight path vector, speed error, and an acceleration cue and an aural airspeed alert that triggers when 
current airspeed deviates beyond a specified threshold from the selected airspeed [18].  
The subject of this paper is a summary and lessons-learned from iterative research and development using sECL 
in conjunction with new and existing eSyn pages during routine air carrier operations and in response to aircraft 
systems affected by a failure (e.g., loss of hydraulic system) or loss of flight critical data (e.g., reliable airspeed 
information). This paper presents findings derived from questionnaire responses and subjective data measures 
including workload, usability, and acceptability as well as objective measures of effectiveness/efficiency in 
completing checklists and their impact on crew decision making. Observations of checklist usage are described when 
the majority of the pilots deviated from checklist procedures due to lack of understanding of a particular step. 
Coincidentally, the series of AIME studies were conducted over a 4-year period during which airlines redesigned 
checklists and developed focused training for dealing with unreliable airspeed information. Observations are detailed 
from some before and after comparisons. Recommendations for checklist design, synoptic page development, and 
technology support for determining sensor validity are described. 
One area of specific focus during AIME testing was on the sensing and detecting of unreliable airspeed 
information, what failures had occurred in the past, and where pilots may still struggle in determining reliable airspeed 
when confronted with conflicting information during actual flight operations. Architectures are described for sensing, 
processing, and distribution of airspeed information to both pilots and the automated systems. Technology concepts 
are presented including a new synoptic page called the System Interaction Synoptic (SIS) that details the flow of flight 
critical data through the avionics system and how it is used by the automation. A second area of synoptic research was 
studied during the AIME testing – enhancing existing synoptic pages by providing failures and effects of failed 
systems - to improve automation state awareness by the crew during non-normal flight events such as a hydraulic 
system failure. These eSyn pages are designed to be used with sECL with the intent to significantly reduce the time 
to configure the flight deck avionics in response to a failure [5, 6, 13, 14].   
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II. Background 
 Information Sources 
Avionics systems provide information to pilots and automation components based on flight parameters that are 
sensed, stored, datalinked, or input by pilots themselves. Sensed parameters are often an analog signal coming from a 
mechanical sensor. In addition, the information may have a mechanical actuator associated with the sensor. Although 
these systems are more reliable than the first-generation sensors, they are still not as reliable as digital components 
and because they interact with a complex atmospheric environment, they can be damaged by environmental issues 
(e.g., rain and volcanic ash, or mechanical damage from bird strikes and rough handling during maintenance). Multiple 
sensors are typically utilized in large aircraft to provide redundancy as a degree of protection from erroneous sources 
of information.  
Redundancy helps meet strict safety criteria but it is not perfect. The design must be shown to have no common 
mode failures or failures where the same failure is propagated across all the redundant components. In the case of 
some of the mechanical sensor components, this has not proven true in operation [19] because of behaviors never 
imagined by the system designer. For instance, an aircraft where a static air data sensor was taped over for maintenance 
while washing and the tape was never removed.  
Dual sensors have now been replaced with systems that had three components and the most recent aircraft designs 
often have quad redundancy. Redundancy is not necessarily perfect or the solution to this problem. Redundant systems 
are designed to vote out one or more non-functioning systems. Nonetheless, even in the modern systems, some 
environmental conditions have affected all the mechanical sensors, often at the same time. High altitude super-cooled 
liquid has overwhelmed pitot systems and volcanic ash cloud has blanketed all systems at once. Although not highly 
probable, if the sensors fail in such a way as to report the same value, it is possible that a good sensor can be outvoted 
by two or more bad sensors. The closer the systems fail in the same time and conditions, the more likely that they will 
fail with the same value.  
Because some sensors fail due to external conditions, the computational elements within the sensor system may 
report the calculated values as valid data and the information is not flagged as erroneous or invalid. The information 
is then processed in all the downstream systems and presented to the pilot as though the information is valid. Although 
the probability may go down with respect to a common mode failure, there are documented instances of all three 
angle-of-attack (AOA) vanes failing in flight with exactly the same value [20]. 
Highly skilled pilots can handle conflicting information by relying on holistic monitoring of all information 
available. For example, when presented with conflicting attitude information, they will typically check if the aircraft 
is changing heading or altitude. When presented with conflicting airspeed information, they will reference the aircraft 
attitude and power settings to see which airspeed makes more sense. This technique can be effective even if there is 
no redundant sensor for each piece of information. Some modern systems have used other available sensor data to 
provide backup information to pilots (e.g., airspeed calculated from AOA and altitude provided from the global 
positioning system, or GPS) and some research suggests similar ways to detect anomalous information, going beyond 
just the sensor value to determining the validity of data using aircraft models [21]. 
 Unreliable Airspeed 
As described previously, classical methods of redundancy and failure mitigation can become problematic in 
dealing with mechanical sensors. Unreliable airspeed, in particular, has been a leading cause of crew difficulty. 
Unreliable airspeed can lead to systemic failures that are difficult to understand, often manifesting themselves with 
both overspeed and stall warnings simultaneously, leaving no simple, effective troubleshooting method. This problem 
has been addressed in training [22], procedural and checklist design, and in hardware and software design mitigations.  
Hardware and software mitigations have been employed on some newer aircraft designs. Sensor probes have been 
redesigned to be more reliable in a wider range of conditions. Sensor redundancy has been increased by multiple units 
and disparate placement on the aircraft. Processing has been used to compare and eliminate detected failures. These 
techniques can be effective but these systems are not immune to common mode failures in the mechanical sensor 
systems.  
 Automation Complexity 
Mechanical system complexity in aircraft has given way to digital complexity where computers determine how to 
manage propulsion, electrical, hydraulic, environmental, and aircraft control. The digital systems are more reliable 
than the electro-mechanical systems they have replaced. This shift in what pilots can control has changed training as 
well. Memorization of all system components and a complete knowledge of how to operate the system has been 
replaced with strict checklist utilization and limited troubleshooting steps. Synoptic page design had been developed 
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for the primary systems on the aircraft and has been updated to reflect the limited control for checklist verification, 
but limited information is available for pilots to determine the flow of information or what information is used in any 
of the automated systems. Digital flight decks were first designed so information was not shared side-to-side unless 
there was a specific pilot action. As sensor processing across multiple redundant systems increased in usage, this 
information was hidden from the pilot, and often the information management of sources was switched automatically 
without pilot knowledge. 
With increased automation and systems reliability, many pilots can go an entire career without experiencing a 
failure. When failures do occur, the rarity may foster confusion, especially if the failure is complex. Although synoptic 
pages are available on some aircraft to help pilots to understand systems, there are limited synoptic or pictorial 
diagrams regarding the flow or interdependency of information derived from sensor processing or on the effects of 
failed systems. The lack of data/information flow representations led to the development of the technology and 
procedural concepts discussed in this paper.  
 Recent Accident and Incidents 
Over a ten-year period from 1996 to 2006, 300 accidents cited incorrect instrument indications in the findings of 
the investigation report. These data support incorrect cockpit indications as a significant contributor to loss of control 
inflight (LOC-I) accidents worldwide and as part of CAST’s work in counter-measures for the loss of airplane state 
awareness. This paper concentrates on anomalous air data information as a causal factor, and the following accidents 
and incidents are a small sample to illustrate the extent of the problem: 
 On 21 November 2013, after a flight from Singapore, an Etihad Airways Airbus A330, A6-EYJ landed at 
Brisbane airport and was taxied to the terminal. Approximately 2 hours later, the aircraft was pushed-back 
from the gate for the return flight to Singapore. The captain rejected the initial take-off attempt after observing 
an airspeed indication failure on his display. The aircraft taxied back to the terminal where troubleshooting 
was carried out, before being released back into service. During the second take-off roll, the crew became 
aware of an airspeed discrepancy after the V1 decision speed and the take-off was continued. Once airborne, 
the crew declared a MAYDAY and decided to return to Brisbane where an overweight landing was carried 
out. Engineering inspection after the overweight landing found that the Captain’s pitot probe was almost 
totally obstructed by an insect nest, consistent with mud-dauber wasp residue. The pitot obstruction had 
occurred during the 2 hour period that the aircraft was on the ground at Brisbane and was not detected during 
troubleshooting after the initial rejected take-off. 
 Air France Flight 447 – an Airbus A330 - crashed while enroute from Rio de Janeiro to Paris on June 1, 2009. 
While at altitude, the air data probes were likely overwhelmed by ice crystals or super cooled water droplets 
and the autopilot disconnected. The flight crew stalled the aircraft while attempting to troubleshoot the 
conflicting instrument indications amid erroneous stall indications.  
 Qantas Flight 72 - an Airbus A330 -  made an emergency landing on October 7, 2008 near Exmouth, Australia 
after a couple of uncommanded sudden pitch down maneuvers caused serious onboard injuries. An AOA 
sensor was determined to be the cause. 
 XL German Airways Flight 888T – an Airbus A320 - crashed in the Mediterranean Sea off the French coast 
on November 27, 2008. The aircraft was involved in a maintenance flight when two of the three AOA sensors 
froze while at altitude. During the descent, one of the maneuvers the crew was checking was to observe the 
envelope protection system’s operation to avoid a stall. The two bad (i.e., frozen) AOA sensors outvoted the 
good sensor and the aircraft stalled and the crew did not recover.  
 Aero Peru Flight 603 – a Boeing 757 - crashed after maintenance failed to remove tape from the static ports. 
The crew was unable to determine correct airspeed information while flying at night. 
 Brigenair Flight 310 – a Boeing 757 - was a charter flight from the Dominican Republic to Germany. The 
aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff on February 6, 1996 while the pilot struggled to determine correct 
airspeed information. The cause was determined to be a blocked pitot tube from an insect nest. 
 In April 1991 the crew of a large corporate jet encountered anomalous airspeed indication on the Captain’s 
instrument on the previous flight. The subsequent flight was at night and during climb out the First Officer’s 
instruments appeared to increase to a high speed and the overspeed clacker warning sounded. After reducing 
power, the Captain’s instrument showed a decrease in speed and because of the previous flight, the crew 
assumed the Captain’s airspeed was the problem. The aircraft subsequently stalled and although disoriented, 
the crew eventually recovered and landed safely. Maintenance confirmed the First Officer’s central air data 
computer had failed. 
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 Northwest Flight 6231 – a Boeing 727 - crashed near Buffalo, New York on a positioning flight shortly after 
takeoff. The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause as the crew’s inability to 
recognize the high AOA and low airspeed of the aircraft resulting in a stall that was unrecoverable. The pitot 
heat switch was found in the off position. 
III. Technology Concepts 
This paper details elements of the AIME experiments that addressed CAST safety enhancement, SE-208, Output 
1b, which calls for “displays that show, in a simple, integrated manner (e.g. a synoptic), the aircraft flight-critical data 
systems in use by automated systems and primary flight instruments, for both the mode currently selected and any 
impending mode transitions expected per design of these systems” [4]. On some aircraft, a set of synoptic pages are 
available on Multi-Function Displays (MFDs) and each provides graphical and textual information regarding the status 
of major subsystems. For example, seven such pages are available for pilot selection on the B-787 including: 
Electrical, Hydraulic, Fuel, Air, Door, Gear, and Flight Controls. Although not yet available on many aircraft types, 
the synoptic concept is explicitly mentioned by CAST as recommended for consideration in SE-208 research. 
The synoptic concept research conducted under the AIME series of experiments explored eSyn pages with 
associated sECL. The sECLs are versions of ECLs that have been shortened when used in conjunction with the eSyn 
pages without any loss of information. Two types of eSyn pages were evaluated: 
(1) New synoptic pages for failures in which no relevant synoptics exist; and,  
(2) Enhancements to existing synoptic pages (e.g., Hydraulic, Flight Controls) to depict and provide additional 
information regarding failures and effects of failed systems.  
These enhancements may allow the simplification of associated electronic checklists by removing information 
now provided on the eSyn display and improve understanding of complicated system dependencies where reading of 
text could lead to confusion or oversight. 
For some types of failures, there is no relevant existing synoptic. In these cases, a new synoptic page could be 
defined. The example used for this research was loss of flight critical data (e.g., airspeed) provided by the air data 
system and inertial reference units. A new eSyn page, referred to here as the SIS, was created that graphically depicted 
whether flight-critical data was valid, the operational state of the sources of the data, and the effects on systems that 
received the data.  
Unique eSyn pages are associated with specific aircraft faults indicated by an EICAS message. The eSyn color 
scheme matches that of the other synoptic pages. Data or data paths shown in green indicate valid data, those shown 
in white indicate operable data but with reduced quality, and those in amber indicate invalid data. The eSyn is available 
to the flight crew as a quick-look reference regarding failures and their effects throughout the flight. 
Associated with the EICAS notification and the eSyn page is a sECL. This shortened checklist is intended to be 
used with the eSyn to enable the pilot monitoring (PM) to complete the non-normal ECL in less time and with greater 
understanding of failure effects. 
 System Interaction Synoptic 
The SIS is designed as an additional tab on the Synoptics display, with associated simplified checklists within the 
Electronic Checklist function. The original SIS indicators and functions are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. The system 
components and architecture shown in Figure 1 represents the Research Flight Deck (RFD) at NASA LaRC (note: the 
system components are modeled after the Boeing 757-200 aircraft which is the RFD simulation model; this graphic 
would be different but a similar concept for the B-787, or other aircraft). The SIS was the first attempt to provide a 
synoptic page that showed the information flow of flight critical data that is used by the automation systems and for 
display to each pilot. Figure 1 shows the normal case where all the data flow is green, and the display and automation 
structure is shown by a cyan schematic. 
Figure 2 represents the change to the SIS that would occur if there is a failure of the air data computer (ADC) 
system. Both ADC boxes are colored amber. The automation and pilot displays now use backup data from AOA and 
GPS where that data is represented by white flow lines. Note that the flight control system is in a secondary mode 
represented by an amber message and the flight director, autopilot, and autothrottle systems are inoperative, also 
represented by amber text and an amber box around the glareshield panel where those controls are located. Selecting 
the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) symbol (Fig. 2) on the SIS would bring up the associated sECL on that EFB. The 
checklist was simplified by removing information now displayed on the SIS.  
The SIS page and sECL were tested with other technologies in AIME 1 [5-11] and those results are detailed in 
Section V of this paper. 
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Fig. 1. SIS indicators and functions on the synoptic display (normal conditions). 
 
Fig. 2. SIS indicators and functions on the synoptic display (non-normal condition). 
 Modified Synoptic Pages 
A test was conducted in the Integration Flight Deck at NASA LaRC using a Boeing B-737-800 flight deck and 
models to evaluate eSyn pages with sECL as an increasingly autonomous system for routine air carrier flight 
operations and in response to aircraft system failures [23]. A B-737-800 flight deck does not have system synoptic 
pages (i.e., graphical depiction of aircraft systems). The lower display unit is sometimes flown with nothing displayed 
or sometimes flown with a system status page shown. Checklists are typically displayed on a portable Electronic Flight 
Bag (EFB).  
The original SIS page (discussed above in AIME 1) was modified slightly, see Fig. 3, to represent B-737 systems, 
and adding lookup values for pitch and power settings representative of aircraft weight and atmospheric conditions to 
facilitate unreliable airspeed checklist usage [23]. This pitch and power information was added after observations from 
pilots performing the checklists in the first AIME experiment.  
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Fig. 3. SIS for B-737 System – normal conditions (left picture) and left airspeed failure (right picture). 
In addition to the SIS page, a new combined system synoptic (CSS) page was added for the IFD experiment. This 
synoptic page, see Fig. 4, is represented as a fuel system synoptic page in normal conditions (left picture) and a 
combined fuel and hydraulic system synoptic page during non-normal conditions (right picture). In the experiment a 
hydraulic failure was utilized to test the new CSS page ideas. Pictorial schematic information was added to the 
hydraulic schematic and each component affected by the failure was displayed in amber (Fig. 4, right picture). 
Information was then graphically depicted that supplemented or eliminated notes in the normal checklist. The graphic 
information had an added benefit, as the notes information was then available for constant review for the rest of the 
flight. The eSyn (SIS or CSS) pages were shown on the lower display unit and the associated sECL were provided on 
outboard-mounted EFBs. This experiment used B-737 rated pilots who were not familiar with synoptic pages in 
general. [Note: This test was not formally a part of the AIME experiment series but results from it did influence the 
iterative AIME synoptic concept research.] 
 
 
Fig. 4. New B-737 combined system synoptic in normal conditions (left picture) and non-normal conditions 
(right picture). 
Versions of these modified synoptic pages were tested in the RFD in AIME 2 with synoptic pages based on the B-
757 systems (see Fig. 5). The RFD has existing hydraulic and flight control synoptic pages, so they were modified 
(i.e., enhanced) to depict additional information regarding hydraulic failures and effects. Additional information was 
added to the new SIS page and existing hydraulic and flight control synoptic pages (see Fig. 5) to remove more notes 
from the checklists. The sECL was provided inboard on the lower MFD. In previous SIS testing, crews commented 
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that an inboard, centrally located position for electronic checklists would be preferred over an outboard location. The 
modified SIS and enhanced existing synoptic pages used with sECL were tested with other technologies in AIME 2 
[12-16] and those results are presented in Section V. 
 
Fig. 5. Enhanced hydraulic system synoptic (left picture) and SIS (right picture) in AIME 2. 
 Current System Interaction Synoptic Page 
The SIS page was further modified after AIME 2 to provide limitations in addition to the note information. Landing 
configuration information was added as textual information on the display in addition to the pitch and power settings 
that were used, see Fig. 6. The SIS page now provides an immediate indication of all the information for continued 
safe flight, all the effects of the current failure on the flight critical data, any automated or manual switching of flight 
critical data for the automation systems or the flight deck displays, and any configuration changes and runway landing 
distance effects, if any, for the approach and landing phase. The modified SIS used in conjunction with simplified 
ECLs (Fig. 7) was tested with other technologies in AIME 2.5 [17-18] and those results are presented in Section V. 
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Fig. 6. SIS elements in AIME 2.5. 
 
 
Fig. 7. SIS with sECL used in AIME 2.5. 
 Simplified Checklists 
Checklists designed to be used with synoptic pages such as discussed in the previous sections may be simplified 
since much of the auxiliary information contained in the checklist is now represented graphically (or as text on the 
graphical display). For complex checklists, the reduction in checklist size can be dramatic. For example, the unreliable 
airspeed checklist was reduced by fifty percent and a six page checklist was reduced to three pages. Further, when 
looking across a number of different checklists, it was found that the critical checklist steps can often be elevated to 
the first page. When flight crews are dealing with all the dynamics of a real emergency, this can mean the difference 
between getting the steps done before interruption by air traffic control or other tasks or distractions.  
 Procedural Changes 
Today’s checklists are utilized the same way that paper checklists have always been used. They are standalone 
troubleshooting procedures and supplemental information is provided from the quick reference handbook (QRH). 
Synoptic pages are sometimes recommended to help understand the checklist procedure; but they are not required. In 
some flight deck implementations the electronic checklist is placed on the multi-function display surface as where the 
synoptic page is normally represented.  
If synoptic pages are used to eliminate notes and other checklist elements, the synoptic pages will be required 
elements and will need to be displayed at the same time as the electronic checklist. This technology will create 
procedural changes in the way pilots handle system failures, but the benefit is the significantly reduced time to 
complete complex checklists and a greater pilot understanding of what needs to be done and why. For the pilot flying, 
especially if manual flight is required until the troubleshooting procedure is complete, graphical information increases 
the likelihood of comprehending the effects when used in conjunction with information provided by the pilot 
monitoring (i.e., observations described in the results section show that the flying pilot does not always pay attention 
to all the notes text in complex procedures. Other demands for his attention have higher priority). 
IV.Test Overview 
 Facility and Environment 
The AIME series of experiments utilized the RFD simulator (Fig. 8) within the Cockpit Motion Facility at NASA 
LaRC. The RFD was originally designed as a B-757 flight deck, but it was modified to create the CAST-recommended 
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reference test condition of B-787-like displays, interfaces, and functions. As such, the simulator is configured with 
four 10.5-inch Vertical (V) by 13.25-inch Horizontal (H), 1280x1024 pixel resolution color displays, tiled across the 
instrument panel. The RFD also includes dual Rockwell Collins HGS-6700 HUDs, MCP, FMS, and EFBs for Pilot 
Flying and Pilot Monitoring. Two five-camera Smart Eye™ head and eye tracking systems are installed to quantify 
both crew member’s head movement and eye-gaze behavior. Both eye tracking systems data outputs and the simulator 
state data output are time-synchronized.   
 
Fig. 8. RFD simulator interior (left) and exterior (right). 
The full-mission RFD utilizes a Boeing B-757-200 aircraft aerodynamic model. Unlike Boeing aircraft, when 
hand-flying, the pilots use sidestick inceptors and these are directly linked as if mechanically connected. The 
autothrottle system backdrives the throttle handles to directly reflect the power setting commanded to the engines. 
Take-off, go-around (TOGA) buttons and autothrottle disconnect buttons are placed on the throttle handles. A 
collimated out-the-window (OTW) scene is produced by a Rockwell Collins Image Generator (IG) graphics system 
providing approximately 200 degrees (deg) H by 40 deg V field-of-view at 26 pixels per degree.  
AIME flight scenarios spanned a range of conditions designed to help expose state awareness issues where the 
technologies under evaluation could prove useful. The scenarios were designed to emulate some of the causal factors 
reported in accidents involving loss of ASA. They were also intended to immerse flight crews in a complex operational 
environment with high-density traffic, adverse weather, digital data link services, synthetic vision systems, area 
navigation/required navigation performance operations. In addition, off-nominal (and complex) situations such as 
unexpected weather events, traffic deviations, equipment failures, unexpected clearances, and changes to flight plans 
were emulated in the scenarios. These features provided a realistic operational environment, albeit a complex one, in 
which flight crews may have little prior experience or training. However, prior similar experiments have shown crews 
can learn and perform well with limited exposure to this environment [24]. Scenario flight times were about 15-20 
minutes.  
 Enhanced Synoptic Pages and Simplified Electronic Checklists Scenarios 
1. AIME-1 Scenarios 
Four non-normal events [6] were flown to evaluate the SIS with sECL technology and were based on actual ASA 
events: Air France (2009), Adam Air (2007), Midwest Express (2005), and Iceland Air (Baltimore, 2002). Two of the 
events emulated a failure within the pitot-static system due to icing/blockage of the pitot and/or static ports, and failure 
of the pitot heat system. Airspeed and altitude become unreliable for the blocked pitot-static system and airspeed 
becomes unreliable for the blocked pitot system. For the loss of air data test conditions, four EICAS warnings are 
triggered. Each has an associated checklist for the pilots to complete using the ECL system. This was representative 
of industry standard operating procedures at the time of this evaluation in 2015. The remaining two non-normal events 
emulated a failure of the Inertial Reference System (IRS), the Inertial Reference Unit (IRU), and/or the Attitude 
Heading Reference Unit (AHRU) resulting in either unreliable position information or unreliable position/attitude 
information and invalid heading information. GPS position became the source for position information and the 
integrated standby flight display (iSFD) became the source for attitude information. Heading had to be manually set 
by the crews on the CDU. 
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2. AIME-2 Scenarios 
Two off-nominal runs were flown to evaluate the eSyn/sECL technology [13]. The off-nominal runs involved 
either a left hydraulic systems failure or unreliable airspeed information due to a blocked pitot-static system. The runs 
ended once the non-normal checklists associated with the failures were completed.  
Hydraulic Failure 
The scenario was initialized at 18,000 ft Mean Sea Level (MSL) in cruise configuration (Landing Gear UP, Flaps 
UP) as the crew prepared for their initial descent for the RNAV RNP 31R approach at JFK. Seven minutes after run 
start, a hydraulic leak occurred that prevented the left engine and left electric hydraulic pumps to supply hydraulic 
pressure. In addition, the failure prevented the power transfer unit from providing system pressure as well. The left 
hydraulics system failure resulted in the following items inoperative: left autopilot, left thrust reverser, normal flap 
extension, and normal gear extension. The crew was required to complete the Hydraulic System Pressure (left only) 
non-normal checklist and to perform alternate flap extension and alternate gear extension. 
Pitot-Static Failure 
The scenario was initialized at 18,000 ft MSL in cruise configuration (Landing Gear UP, Flaps UP) as the crew 
prepared for their initial descent for the RNAV RNP 13L approach at JFK. At run startup, an EICAS message “HEAT 
PITOT L-C-R” was triggered for failure of the pitot heat system. The aircraft was in weather with precipitation at that 
time. At 10 mi from waypoint CAMRN, an ATC datalink message “HOLD AT CAMRN AS PUBLISHED, 2 
MINUTE LEGS, MAINTAIN 210 KNOTS, EXPECT FURTHER CLEARANCE IN 30 MINUTES, DESCEND IN 
THE HOLD TO 6000” was issued. Descending through 9,000 ft MSL, a total failure of the pitot-static system occurred 
due to icing/blockage of the pitot and static ports as a result of the annunciated failure of the pitot heat system. This 
condition triggered an EICAS message “UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED”, as airspeed and altitude information became 
unreliable and their sources switched to AOA airspeed and GPS altitude, respectively, for both Captain and First 
Officer PFDs. This failure also caused the autopilot, autothrottles, and flight directors to become inoperative. The 
crews had to manually fly the aircraft (without flight guidance or autothrottles) while they completed the six page 
Unreliable Airspeed ECL. 
3. AIME 2.5 Scenario 
One off-nominal run was flown to evaluate the SIS/sECL concept. The off-nominal run involved unreliable 
airspeed information due to a blocked pitot system [18]. The runs ended once the unreliable airspeed checklist was 
completed. 
Pitot Failure 
The scenario path and trigger point for the total pitot system blockage was identical as that employed in AIME 2 
for the total pitot-static system blockage. Descending through 9,000 ft MSL, a total failure of the pitot system occurred 
due to icing/blockage of the pitot ports and failure of the pitot heat system. This condition triggered an EICAS message 
“UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED”, as airspeed information became unreliable and its source switched to AOA airspeed 
for the Captain’s PFD. This failure also caused the autopilot, autothrottles, and flight directors to become inoperative. 
The crews had to manually fly the aircraft (without flight guidance or autothrottles) while they completed the six page 
Unreliable Airspeed ECL. The runs ended once the crews completed the unreliable airspeed checklist. 
 Procedures 
For the AIME experiments, commercial airline pilots flew scripted scenarios such as above in the RFD. Captains 
and First Officers from the same airline were paired to ensure crew coordination and cohesion with regard to airline 
standard operational procedures. The Captain flew in the left seat of the flight deck and the First Officer flew in the 
right for the duration of the test. Each crew began with a few runs for familiarization with the simulator and the new 
technologies. Data collection runs followed these training runs [5, 13, 18]. Data were collected individually from the 
pilot flying (PF) and the pilot monitoring (PM). The Captain and First Officer alternated PF/PM roles periodically so 
that each pilot assumed each role for about half the scenarios. Roles were not changed during flights, only between. 
 Subjects 
68 commercial airline pilots (34 crews), representing 4 U.S. airlines, participated in the AIME experiments. All 
subjects were Airline Transport Pilot-rated and currently qualified in wide body commercial aircraft. Captains had an 
average of 23,478 commercial flight hours with 20 having an average of 16.2 years military flight experience. First 
Officers had an average of 12,788 commercial flight hours with 22 having an average of 15.0 years military flight 
experience.  
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V.  Summary Findings 
Analyses of post-run usability ratings, acceptability ratings, and workload ratings as well as pilot feedback 
regarding the evolution of the eSyn/sECL technologies tested in the three AIME experiments are presented. Table 1 
shows the type of synoptic tested, new SIS or enhanced existing synoptic pages, and the number of post-test ratings 
given for each during the AIME experiments. Additionally, post-test usability and acceptability ratings of the 
SIS/sECL technology tested in AIME 2.5 are presented. Interval plots of the usability, acceptability, and workload 
ratings with a 95% confidence interval of the mean are presented in Figures 9-13. eSyn/sECL performance was 
characterized by the time to complete the non-normal checklists (e.g., Unreliable Airspeed, Hydraulic Systems 
Pressure -Left Only) associated with a particular event (e.g., blocked pitot) or failure (e.g. left hydraulics system) and 
is also discussed. 
Table 1. Number of post-run ratings for eSyn/sECL technology 
AIME Experiment Enhanced Synoptics and Simplified Electronic Checklists (eSyn/sECL) 
Number of Post-Run Ratings Collapsed across 
Crew Role 
1 SIS 41 
2 SIS 14 
2 Hydraulic and Flight Control Synoptics 12 
2.5 SIS 20 
 Usability and Acceptability  
The System Usability Scale (SUS) [25] was used to gauge how pilots assessed the usability of the eSyn/sECL 
technologies tested over the AIME series of experiments. Using the method described in [26], SUS scores were 
calculated based on ten sub-scores and fell in a range from 0 to 100, but these are not percentile ranks. SUS scores 
can be associated with specific letter grades and adjective ratings [26]. A SUS score between 68 and 80.3 is considered 
a “good” design and a score above 80.3 is considered an “excellent” design. SUS ratings were taken after each 
eSyn/sECL run for AIME 1, 2, and 2.5 experiments. In AIME 2.5, post-test SUS ratings were also taken to evaluate 
the most current SIS format and sECL.  
Across all AIME experiments, the eSyn/sECL interface was considered a good design for handling both the SIS 
and hydraulic failure runs as all PF and PM mean scores were above 68 (see Fig. 9). However, there was a decrease 
in both PF and PM post-run usability scores for the SIS with sECL between AIME 1 and AIME 2 experiments. This 
decrease may be due to two experiment differences: (1) the unreliable airspeed checklist was revised after AIME-1 
testing to reflect the current industry standard at the time of AIME-2 testing; and, (2) in AIME 2 the crews received 
in-classroom training of the SIS with sECL but not in-simulator training. Post-test, some pilots commented that they 
felt they did not have enough training on the use of the new synoptic page with simplified electronic checklists, and 
this may be indicative of the lower scores. The principal investigators took that as a lesson-learned and in AIME 2.5 
testing provided both in-class and in-simulator training of the new SIS page and sECL. A different flight critical data 
failure was used for AIME 2.5 in-simulator training than what was used in data collection so that the failure was a 
“surprise” to the flight crews. AIME 2.5 SIS usability scores were comparable to AIME 1 scores in that PF ratings 
indicated a good design for the SIS/sECL and the PM ratings indicated an excellent design.  
 
 
Fig. 9. Post-run usability scores for pilot flying and pilot monitoring across AIME experiment series. 
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Acceptability of the eSyn/sECL technology was self-assessed after each run using a seven point Likert scale with 
a rating of 1 being “very unacceptable,” a rating of 7 being “very acceptable,” and a rating of 4 being “average.” In 
AIME 2.5, post-test acceptability ratings were also taken for the most current SIS format and sECL. 
Self-reported post-run acceptability ratings revealed both the PF (mean value of 5.5) and PM (mean value of 5.8) 
found the eSyn/sECL to be highly acceptable for dealing with the hydraulic failure event and unreliable flight critical 
data events tested over the AIME experiment series (see Fig. 10). As was noted for the usability scores, there was a 
decrease in the acceptability ratings for the SIS/sECL technology from AIME 1 to AIME 2 experiments. However, 
increased training on the SIS format in AIME 2.5 testing appears to have brought the acceptability ratings back up to 
AIME 1 levels for both the PF and PM. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Post-run acceptability ratings for pilot flying and pilot monitoring across AIME experiment series. 
AIME 2.5 crews were asked to provide SUS ratings and acceptability ratings for the SIS/sECL after they had 
completed all data collection runs for the day. As shown in Fig. 11, crews rated the current SIS format and sECL as a 
good design for the PF (mean = 79.5) and an excellent design for PM (mean = 90.5). Both PF and PM rated the 
SIS/sECL as being highly acceptable for dealing with unreliable airspeed information (Fig. 12). 
 
 
Fig. 11. Post-test usability scores for captain and first officer for AIME 2.5 experiment. 
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Fig. 12. Post-test acceptability ratings for captain and first officer for AIME 2.5 experiment. 
 Workload 
The NASA Task Load Index (TLX) [27] method captures a subjective rating (0 - “Low” to 100 - “High”) of 
perceived task load. There are six subscales of workload represented in the NASA TLX: mental demand, physical 
demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration level. Overall workload was calculated as the 
unweighted average of the ratings of the six subscales for both the PF and PM and was used to examine task load 
variation for the SIS/sECL and enhancements to existing synoptic pages/sECL. 
Based on the questionnaire responses using TLX over the series of AIME experiment, the resulting PF and PM 
workload ratings are shown in Fig. for the two types of enhanced synoptic pages, new SIS and on existing synoptic 
pages, tested.  
For the hydraulic failure runs where crews used the simplified electronic checklists and enhanced hydraulic and 
flight control synoptic pages, pilots rated their overall workload (Fig. 13) as being moderate as reflected in the PF 
(mean rating of 46) and PM (mean rating of 58) TLX ratings. Similarly, crews rated their overall workload as moderate 
for both the PF (mean rating of 56) and PM (mean rating of 55) when using the SIS with sECL to troubleshoot and 
manage unreliable flight critical data during flight. There were no significant PF or PM workload differences for the 
eSyn/sECL in the off-nominal flight conditions tested (left hydraulic failure or unreliable flight critical data 
information). 
 
 
Fig. 13 Pilot flying and pilot monitoring TLX ratings for enhanced synoptics/SIS with sECL. 
 Pilot Comments 
Crews provided comments on the eSyn/sECL technology during the post-run ratings. Each crew also participated 
in a post-test interview and debriefing where they also completed a short questionnaire asking them to provide 
comments regarding their overall satisfaction with the Enhanced Synoptics (SIS or on existing synoptic pages) and 
simplified electronic checklists technology concept. Discussion and selected observations from these are provided 
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below for the two types of enhanced synoptics with simplified electronic checklists tested over the series of AIME 
experiments. 
1. SIS and Simplified Electronic Checklist 
Pilot comments supported the favorable usability and acceptability ratings and moderate workload scores provided 
by the SIS with sECL technology during the AIME series of experiments [6, 13, 18]. Example comments include: 
“The synoptics make it so much better, gives the big picture of the situation at a glance.” 
“Increases SA significantly, and avoids PM becoming buried in long checklists.” 
“Expedites working through otherwise lengthy checklists. Allows both pilots to stay in the 
flight.” 
“Backed up the EICAS message for 100% understanding of the malfunction. EICAS only gives 
a title to the problem. This was like opening a book and immediately being given the rest of the 
story to understand what exactly the effects were.” 
“The notes on the SIS page were very helpful and flight critical data computations would 
vastly improve mental models of required system state. These computations free up time for 
stick and rudder monitoring and flying.” 
“I am extremely satisfied with the information provided by the SIS and simplified electronic 
checklist. Knowing exactly what systems one has lost is key to solving the problem or deciding 
whether to land immediately or fly with the malfunction until destination. If it is possible to 
further shorten the ECL, I would recommend it. All items listed must be read and it takes too 
much time. OBJECTIVES are not always needed and notes referring to go to a synoptic are 
not required. We will do that without direction.” 
“Very helpful in seeing what the problem is. Having pitch and power information available is 
a huge timesaver. This enhances flight safety by not wasting lot of time. Knowing what PFD is 
malfunctioning adds a lot of confidence as well as the source of the data. You can evaluate the 
situation quickly. Overall, very satisfied with the display and checklist.” 
“Great device, collects all data into one convenient display. Timely data for unreliable 
airspeed/NAV AIR and DAT SYS. Pitch and power data display invaluable.” 
As indicated above, the majority of pilots were satisfied with the content and presentation on the SIS, but a few 
provided suggested improvements as shown by these comments.  
 “Very satisfied. . . But I wonder if it can be simplified even more. Synoptics are still very 
busy....maybe highlight in red or bold the "big ticket" items to a safe landing.” 
“Would like to see all "do not use" or failed items on synoptic page - if possible.” 
“Good system. However the items on the SIS page that lists APP/LDG LIMITATIONS could 
stand out a little more. Also the bottom left/right area of screen could stand out a little more.” 
2. Enhancements to Existing Synoptic Pages and Simplified Electronic Checklists 
In general, pilots favored using the enhanced flight control and hydraulic synoptic pages in concert with a 
simplified electronic checklist for the left hydraulic failure employed in AIME 2. Pilot comments supported the SUS 
ratings that found the technology to be a good system design for understanding the effects of such a failure on the 
aircraft and aircraft systems. Example written comments include:  
“This very much improves understanding of the state of the aircraft system, both the 
malfunction and how it affects aircraft control. Having it graphically displayed and with short 
phrases ("do not autoland") right on the display in amber made it easy to understand what we 
were dealing with and how to proceed. Even as PF, I could glance over and see it.” 
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“Excellent improvement. Really like the landing distance calculations.” 
“Overall, satisfied with the concept and the display and I did feel it increased my SA 
concerning the energy state.” 
“It is a nice enhancement with ever increasing system complexity. Quick access to important 
flight information.” 
“Better than standard. The pictorials are easier to understand then written word. Especially 
performance numbers.” 
“Highly beneficial in visualizing and understanding certain system malfunctions!” 
“This is great and should be implemented ASAP. Everything that you've lost is condensed on 
one page with landing distances, so you don't have to search through QRHs to find numbers.” 
One pilot commented that additional training may be needed in order to fully comprehend the information on the 
enhanced synoptic pages. 
““I think there is a lot of information available and perhaps with more training it would be 
less cumbersome to see all the info it's presenting.” 
 eSyn/sECL Checklist Completion Time  
Time-to-complete relevant checklist(s) can be an indicator for effectively handling failures and understanding their 
effects.  
In AIME 1, the SIS allowed for a reduction of the original four checklists associated with the loss of air data test 
condition by a total of 432 lines of text. Individual checklists were reduced by as much as 50% and sometimes able to 
fit on one page [6]. The combination of the pictorial information on the SIS, indicating what systems were working 
and what had failed, combined with the shortened checklists significantly reduced time to complete the procedure 
compared to when crews had to complete it using the original length checklists without the SIS (i.e., the baseline 
condition). When using the SIS, there was much less confusion among the crews as to the effects of these types of 
failures and much more effective discussion and decision-making with respect to appropriate actions to take (e.g., 
frequent pointing to the SIS graphic versus reading aloud lines of text on the ECL). 
In AIME 2, the SIS with sECL allowed for a 25% reduction in checklist completion time (mean time of 9 min 21 
sec with SIS) compared to the baseline condition (mean time of 12 min 25 sec) for the blocked pitot-static system 
which resulted in unreliable airspeed information. On average, crews were able to complete the non-normal checklist 
three minutes sooner using the eSyn/sECL technology as compared to using the standard ECL. The maximum time 
savings across all runs for the blocked pitot-static system was 58% (9 min and 29 sec). 
Similarly in AIME 2, the crews were able to complete the non-normal checklist for the left hydraulic systems 
failure significantly faster when using the enhanced hydraulic and flight control synoptic pages with the sECL (mean 
time of 8 min 57 sec) versus when only using the baseline checklist (mean time of 12 min 54 sec). On average, crews 
were able to complete the non-normal checklist almost four minutes sooner using the eSyn/sECL technology as 
compared to using the baseline Synoptics/ECL [18]. This is a time reduction of ~30%. The maximum time savings 
across all runs for the left hydraulic systems failure was 42% (6 min and 10 sec).  
In AIME 2.5, the crews (on average) completed the unreliable airspeed in 6 min and 18 sec using the SIS/sECL 
technology for the blocked pitot system. 
VI. Conclusions 
Two types of eSyn/sECL concepts were evaluated - a new synoptic page (i.e., SIS) as well as enhancements to 
existing synoptic pages. Both were evaluated when used in conjunction with simplified electronic checklists and were 
deemed usable and acceptable by the participating flight crews. Further, evaluations were conducted in a relevant 
environment and spanned a set of complex situations such as encountered by crews in previous incidents/ accidents. 
Demonstrations raised the TRL of these concepts to five (or higher) and achieved the CAST goal for relevant research 
outputs.  
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For enhanced synoptic pages where simplified checklists are used with information elements designed into the 
synoptic pages, crew workload was reduced and time-to-complete procedures was reduced by as much as 30 percent. 
Minutes saved can often make the difference between safe completion of the flight and an accident or incident. The 
time saved helps manage the overall workload of dealing with real emergencies like handling communications with 
ATC and dispatch and making good continue or divert decisions. When crews are pressed for time they tend not to 
gather other critical information. In addition to time savings, it was clear that the crews had a better understanding of 
the situation by having access to a graphical display coupled to the checklist. This better understanding makes it less 
likely an inadvertent error will be made while handling an off-nominal situation. 
The SIS was designed to meet the need for an information graphic to augment pilot understanding of the information 
processing of the automation in a form that was familiar, like the mechanical aircraft systems schematics. At a high 
level it shows in simple form which aircraft state information elements are correct, how those elements are presented 
to the flight deck displays, and what information is currently used for the automation and envelope protection systems. 
The additional information provided for aircraft control including pitch and power settings consistent with current 
aircraft environmental conditions and aircraft state like gross weight, flaps, and gear configuration allows for immediate 
safe operation of the aircraft and faster decision making for determining reliable versus unreliable information. The 
status information provides immediate and persistent indications of the result of any failures on continued safe flight 
and if landing data and configuration needs to be adjusted.  
Distractions are one of the largest variables in the time-to-complete procedures. Most often, these distractions occur 
from ATC or operations center communications or from assistance requested from other crew members. One of the 
things we have observed conducting studies in relevant environments is that emergency procedures conducted in actual 
flying conditions are different than airline simulator training. Crews are told to declare an emergency and to contact 
dispatch for help, but it is very different when you actually communicate with real people instead of verbalizing the 
step. In realistic environments and real life, ATC will attempt to help. They will ask for critical information they need 
in trying to decide how to handle the flight and they often contact the crew multiple times. Crews feel the need to 
provide the information and that contributes to increased time-to-complete the checklist and significantly increases the 
risk of missed checklist steps.  
Although the time-to-complete relevant checklists was substantial and provided a significant safety benefit and a 
margin for handling other time critical tasks, time-to-complete checklists in the study had significant variance. Some of 
those factors were illuminated here but the variability highlights the relative importance of getting critical steps as early 
in the procedure as possible. Often critical checklist steps can be elevated to the first page of a complex checklist. Items 
can be evaluated before other distractions take place. In actual flight conditions, it is likely the reduction of checklist 
completion time with eSyn and sECL will be greater than shown in these studies, which can further increase the safety 
margin.  
The test scenarios were designed to stress crews and provide discrimination in the data analysis. Crews had to be 
trained on new systems without providing an indication to the actual failures being tested so they would be truly 
surprised as in an actual emergency. The scenario conditions were chosen with actual distractions like runway changes 
or spurious traffic calls at precise times. When airspeed failures occur near maximum or minimum operating speeds, 
the aircraft quickly enters actual overspeed or near stall conditions. These events were used as well in the design of the 
scenarios. 
Pilots were unanimous in feeling the enhanced synoptic display and the associated reduced checklists make relevant 
tasks much less demanding. Most pilots commented that providing the big picture of the situation at a glance allowed 
for quickly realizing what systems are still available versus those that are inoperative. Several appreciated its role in 
providing a backup to the EICAS messages for better understanding of malfunctions. 
One negative aspect with respect to synoptics is that current non-normal procedures do not require reference to 
synoptic pages, even in aircraft where these displays are part of the type certificate. If, as suggested in this paper, 
references to synoptic pages replace more detailed prose on checklists, the synoptic display may call for additional 
certification costs (i.e., the synoptic becomes essential equipment to complete a non-normal checklist). A risk-based 
approach for certification is now in place for Part 23 aircraft, perhaps the same approach can be applied to Part 121 
aircraft for secondary information like synoptic displays allowing reductions in certification costs for technology that 
has a clear and proven safety benefit. This may allow cost-effective retrofit of such technology. 
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